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THE SOUTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW:
RECONSIDERATIONS AND PROSPECTS
ERNEST L. FoLK, III*
The preceding articles provide a useful picture, both in
general and in detail, of the Corporation law. The purpose
of this "concluding unscientific postscript"-to borrow Kier-
kegaard's phrase-is to note developments since enactment of
the new Law, to comment on points raised in the articles,
and to point to amendments which the Joint Committee1 has
recommended to the General Assembly.2
I.
The new Corporation law was enacted by the 1962 General
Assembly, and on March 30, 1962, the Governor's signature
completed the legislative process. The effective date of the
statute was purposely postponed to January 1, 1964, for two
reasons: to permit necessary amendments, and to afford the
bar and business an opportunity to become familiar with the
new law and to recognize the many changes it effects. Both
of these objectives have been largely implemented.
When the South CarolinaBar Association, at its Charleston
convention in May 1962, authorized a Continuing Legal Edu-
cation Program for the Bar, a summer course in the new
Corporation law was featured as one of the two initial offer-
ings in this "pilot program."3 A 24 hour course was pre-
sented for six weeks during June and July 1962, at the Law
School in Columbia, 4 with attendance by many attorneys
from all parts of the State. Besides concentrated lectures on
*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Reporter,
South Carolina Corporation Law Revision Project. The views expressed
in this article are those of the Reporter, and do not necessarily represent
the opinions of the Joint Committee or any of its members except when
so stated or clearly indicated.
1. "Joint Committee" refers to the Committee, chaired by Senator
Richardson of Sumter, to Investigate the Feasibility of Revising the Se-
curities and Corporations Laws of this State.
2. References to the amendments are to sections of the Technical
Amendments Bill (cited as TEcH. AMEND. BILL), introduced in the Gen-
eral Assembly in February, 1963.
3. Professor Charles H. Randall offered a course in estate planning,
including tax problems of small estates.
4. The class, taught by the author of this article, met on Wednesday
and Thursday of each of six weeks.
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the main features of the new law, the class provided a forum
for vigorous discussion and debate. Thus, not only did the
course make a breakthrough in familiarizing the bar with
the new statute, but the searching study, analysis, and criti-
cism of the law afforded an unparalleled opportunity to learn
what amendments might be desirable, to clarify statutory
language, remove hidden ambiguities, or add new substantive
provisions. And, indeed, from this course came a number of
recommendations for changes, all of which were carefully
scrutinized. During the autumn, the Reporter continued the
study of these suggestions, and drafted for the Joint Com-
mittee a group of amendments. Most of these merely alter
details, since, on a whole, the new statute survived well the
searching analysis of the fifty or more attorneys in the sum-
mer course.
Two major problems, fully discussed later, were sharply
highlighted as the study progressed. First, the vague lan-
guage of the constitutional provision requiring cumulative
voting for directors 5 has emerged as a potential threat to
many provisions of the new statute, even though the 1962
Act, like the old law, makes cumulative voting mandatory.
The focal question is whether the constitutional section may
indeed outlaw all non-voting stock, including non-voting pre-
ferred shares, and, less frequently, non-voting common
shares." Secondly, although the 1962 Act requires that cor-
porate documents be filed only with the Secretary of State,
there is agitation to require that they also be recorded local-
ly, that is, with the clerk of court of the county in which the
corporation locates its registered office. These two problems
have been considered by the Joint Committee. As for the
constitutional provision, it seem likely that some change in
the constitutional provision will be submitted to the voters in
the 1964 elections. As for the local filing proposals, there ii,
at present, no firm decision by the Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee has prepared a bill amending the Act
primarily on technical points. These are virtually all mat-
ters of detail, clarifying uncertain terminology, removing
latent ambiguities, and adding several substantive provisions
5. S. C. CONST. art. IX, §11.
6. Uncertainties as to the legality of non-voting common stock
prompted a large South Carolina corporation to reincorporate in Delaware.
This event, more than any other single occurrence, spurred wide demands
for corporation law revision in this State.
[Vol. 15
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which should appear in the new law. The significant propo-
sals will be discussed later.
II.
Both the articles and law notes in this Symposium issue,
besides describing the provisions of the new act, perform a
law review article's vital function of offering criticisms and
suggestions. It is appropriate to consider these points, espe-
cially since some of them are dealt with as proposed amend-
inents to the act.
1. Local Filing of Corporate Documents: Mr. Blackwell's
article reflects the view of many practitioners that the ab-
!sence of any requirement for filing corporate documents with
the county clerk is a "weakness in the new act." In the Draft
Version, the act did require that all corporate documents be
recorded locally, that is, with the clerk of court of the county
in which the corporation locates its registered office. The
mechanics for doing so were that the Secretary of State would
receive two copies of the corporate document; one of these
would be filed in his office at Columbia, and he would for-
ward the other to the appropriate county clerk for recorda-
tion.7 It was generally accepted that our modern new statute
should not retain the old procedure by which the corporation
-must undertake to record the document locally, since failure
to record locally was not infrequent, and non-recordation of
the appropriate document threw doubt upon the validity of
the action taken. Especially in the case of articles of incor-
poration, the failure to record locally may cloud the legal
-status (de jure existence) of the corporation, and thus compel
reliance on that judicial makeshift, the doctrine of de facto
corporations. For these reasons, the choice was reduced to
-two alternatives: either require the Secretary of State to send
the document to the clerk for recordation, or drop the recor-
dation requirement- entirely. When the bill was offered to
the 1962 General Assembly, recordation was dispensed with,
-for two reasons: (1) conviction of some members of the Joint
'Committee that local filing served no useful purpose justify-
ing a recordation requirement, but merely added an addi-
7. The Secretary of State would also collect local recording fees and
'forward them periodically to each court clerk. Of course, there must be
a uniform state-wide recording fee schedule, since it would be impractical
Tor the Secretary of State to ascertain different fees for each county.
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tional formality to a procedure which should be as simple,
short and inexpensive as possible, and (2) assertions that the
responsibility on the Secretary of State would be unduly bur-
densome, if he were required to forward documents for local
recordation.
Some attorneys believe that corporate documents should be
recorded locally, because of asserted advantages in title-
searching. Initially, one wonders why it is insuperably diffi-
cult to ascertain, by a telephone call typically, whether a
document has been filed with the Secretary of State. Even if
local recording is required, it is by no means certain that, as
to any given corporation, there will be on file all of the docu-
ments that an attorney may wish, since the corporation may
have neglected to record locally. Again, all corporate docu-
ments will not be recorded in every county in which the cor-
poration has real property; for it would be intolerable to put
any corporation to the expense and trouble of filing docu-
ments in possibly every county of the state.
If the bar insists upon requiring local recordation, the ex-
pedited procedure set forth in the Draft Version of the cor-
poration law certainly should be used. This would require
the Secretary of State to accept two copies of the document:
one for filing in his office, the other to be sent to the clerk
of court of the county in which the corporation locates its
registered office. Thus, at the time the charter is issued (i.e.,
when the Secretary of State endorses the original document
for filing in his office), he would initiate the mechanical
process eventuating in local recordation of the document.- In
sum, if documents must be locally recorded, it is imperative,
if we are to have a streamlined, convenient corporation stat-
ute, that the recordation be effected through the office of the
Secretary of State;8 and the appropriation by the General
Assembly for such additional help as may be needed in the
Secretary's office would pay rich dividends, in efficiency, and
8. Several states, including several which have recently enacted ex-
cellent new corporation statutes, require the Secretary of State to forward
the document to the county clerk. See IOWA CODE ANN. §496A.53: 'If in
this Act, it is required that any document be . . . filed and recorded in
the office of the county recorder, the secretary of state upon recording
such document in his office shall forward the same to the county recorder
of the county wherein the registered office of the corporation is located"'
and to any other county recorders if multiple recording is required. Sim-
ilar duties are imposed on the Secretary of State by N. Y. Bus. Cor.
LAW §104(g); VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-51; and MINN. STAT. ANX.
§§301.06-07.
[Vol. 15
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in the reputation of the State among corporate counsel, both
here and elsewhere, for modern expedited procedures bene-
fitting business. If we wish to facilitate business and indus-
try, we can ill afford to continue inconvenient and antique
filing procedures. 9
2. Corporate Name:10 Several changes have been pro-
posed in section 3.1 which states the basic requirements as to
the name of the corporation. First, as enacted, the 1962 stat-
ute, following the Model Act,"l required that each foreign and
domestic corporation indicate its corporate character in its
name, either by using some word unmistakably connoting
corporateness (such as "limited" or "incorporated" or "cor-
poration") or an abbreviation of one of these words (viz.,
"ltd.", "inc.", or "corp."). In addition, the 1962 Act required
existing domestic corporations to amend their charter by add-
ing such a word or abbreviation if the corporate name was
deficient in this respect; a like requirement was made for
foreign corporations authorized to do business in South Caro-
lina, at least for purposes of operations in South Carolina.
Although there is no substantial question of South Carolina's
power to make these requirements, even as to authorized for-
eign corporations, the practical application and enforcement
of these provisions as to existing domestic and authorized
foreign corporations, made them seem not worth the expense
and delay. Moreover, many corporations thought that such
requirements extended to office signs, names on trucks, sta-
tionery, etc. Obviously, the requirement applied only to the
official corporate name as it appears on the records of the
Secretary of State, and did not prevent the customary short-
ening of corporate names for other uses (short of fraud or
misrepresentation). To sidestep practical administrative
problems and avoid confusion, an amendment is proposed
9. Since the 1962 act does not require acknowledgement of corporate
documents, but a verification procedure (see §1.5), several unnecessary
references to acknowledgement are deleted. See, e.g., TECH. AMEND. BILL
§27, amending §4.2 of the 1962 act.
10. Corporate Powers. A number of minor word changes which are
clarifying rather than substantive changes, have been proposed to §2.1,
the corporate powers provision. However, one amendment (TEcH. AMEND.
BILL §17) would expand §2.2(a) (17) to make explicit corporate power
to take out "key-man" insurance "on the life of any shareholder for the
purpose of reacquiring at his death shares owned by such shareholder,"
since stock repurchase options or contracts are particularly desired in
close corporations.
11. MODEL ACT §§7(a) (domestic corporations); 101(a) (foreign cor-
porations).
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which will delete section 3.1's requirements for some indicia
of corporateness as to all corporations, domestic or foreign,
existing or holding authority on the effective date of the act,
nor will "new" foreign corporations be required to designate
a word or abbreviation when qualifying under the new act to
do business in South Carolina.1 2 However, a new domestic
corporation must designate some word or abbreviation un-
mistakably indicating its corporate character. And partner-
ships and other non-corporate enterprises continue to be for-
bidden to use these symbols of corporateness. This compro-
mise admittedly rests upon practical administrative consid-
erations, certainly not on demands of consistency; but there
is scarcely any invidious discrimination since it is an easy
matter for new domestic corporations to select the word or
abbreviation they wish to use and insert it in the corporate
name set forth in the articles of incorporation. 13 Needless to
say, a creditor who has been misled into believing that an
enterprise has unlimited liability when in fact it is incor-
porated has a right of action for fraud.
A provision,14 originally appearing at the end of section
3.1 (a) (3) (D), permitted one corporation to use another cor-
poration's name if the latter expressly consented and filed a
document of consent with the Secretary of State. Because
such permission could mislead third parties, contrary to pub-
lic interest, its omission from the act has been proposed as
an amendment.'5 Mr. Monteith's law note rightly suggests
that otherwise there are inroads upon the principle, embodied
in section 3.1 (g), that the rules regarding corporate name do
not "abrogate or limit" the law of unfair competition.
3. Corporate Finance: Chapter 5 of new new act, broadly
treating issue of shares as well as dividends, distributions, 6
and share purchases, largely rests on the Model Act. These
provisions evidently have not generated undue concern
among attorneys although they mark a significant depar-
ture from prior law by following the contemporary trend to
12. See TEcH. AMEND. BILL §23.
13. In contrast, a foreign corporation must amend its charter in its
jurisdiction of incorporation or take other action to comply with the re-
quired name change; existing domestic corporations would find it necessary
to amend their charter.
14. Based on OHiO STAT. ANN. §1701.05 (a).
15. Deleted by TEcH. AMEND. BILL §23.
16. The term "distribution" is a word of art which distinguishes certain
corporate outlays of funds which cannot qualify as a dividend under
§§5.14 and 5.15.
[Vol. 15
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declare legal rules, especially as to dividends and other dis-
tributions, in terms of corporate accounting concepts. Al-
though this achieves greater accuracy, these provisions de-
mand careful study and an understanding of at least the ele-
mentary techniques and concepts of corporate accounting.
Earned surplus as the basic dividend test 7 is the pre-eminent
example of invoking accounting concepts as legal test
Several criticisms offered by Mr. Nexsen's article are well
taken and will be corrected by proposed amendments to the
1962 Act. For example, an amendment will remove any po-
tential conflict between sections 4.3(b) and 5.2, so that it is
clear from both provisions that series of shares within a class
may not vary as to par or no-par value, but must be identical
on this point.' s
Mr. Nexsen analyses various provisions dealing with the
status of shares not fully paid. The act's relevant provisions,
briefly stated, are that (1) only shares fully paid in lawful
consideration are non-assessable, 19 (2) promissory notes and
other stockholder indebtedness are not lawful consideration
for shares, 20 (3) shareholders continue liable only for unpaid
consideration,2 ' and (4) no certificate may be issued until
shares are fully paid.2 2 As to subscriptions for shares, the
corporation has a statutory lien attaching to the shares sub-
scribed.23 No recital on a share certificate is needed to per-
fect this lien, since (1) no certificate may be issued until the
shares are fully paid,24 and (2) section 7.18's required recital
of a "lien in favor of a corporation" applies only to "shares
represented by a certificate issued by such corporation," 25
that is, to shares fully paid and thus entitled to be "repre-
sented by a certificate." Hence, there is no inconsistency on
the question of the lien. Underlying these provisions, and
17. Section 5.14 (a) (1) and the definition of earned surplus in §1.2 (q).
18. TECH. AMEND. BILL §28, which strikes from §5.3(b) (1) the phrase
"or any series within a class of shares" wherever it appears.
19. Section 5.9(a).
20. Section 5.7(b).
21. Section 6.23(a).
22. Section 5.10(a).
23. Section 5.5(d).
24. Section 5.10(a).
25. Section 7.18 is part of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, long in
force in this State as S. C. CODE §12-320 (1962). If the UNIFORM COM-
MERCIA. CODE, presently under study for possible adoption in South Caro-
lina, is enacted, it will, of course, repeal Chapter 7 of the 1962 Corporation
Act, although U. C. C. §8-103 continues the essence of §7.18 of the 1962
act.
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making them consistent, is the premise that shares may be
outstanding (i.e., for dividend and voting purposes) although
not fully paid, and therefore not entitled to the stock certifi-
cate which is the readily transferable evidence of ownership
of shares. 26 Indeed, it is well established that shares may be
outstanding although not fully paid. The prohibition on issu-
ing a certificate for shares not fully paid is a real sanction,
since the transfer of stock without a certificate, even if theo-
retically possible, would never be done in practice. Hence,
this prohibition should eliminate the abuse by which a share-
holder, having paid little or nothing on his shares, transfers
them at a profit measured by the sale price less the amount
(if any) he paid. Even in this situation, should it arise, the
transferor remains liable for the unpaid portion of the con-
sideration.2 7 The other potential abuse, control or domina-
tion through ownership by insiders of shares only partly paid
for, or received for less than the public offering price, may
better be remedied by section 305(g) of the Uniform Securi-
ties Act permitting the Securities Commissioner to place in-
siders' shares in escrow.
28
As to fractional shares, Mr. Nexsen accurately observes
that section 5.11 is exclusive, and therefore should bar the
abuse, apparently not unknown in South Carolina, of disre-
garding fractional share interests. Obviously, in a prosperous
corporation whose shares have been rarely if ever split, a
fractional share interest may be valuable,29 and disregarding
such an interest seems unwarranted and contrary to public
policy.30
4. Shaureholders: Mr. Moore's article criticizes many pro-
visions in the chapter on shareholders; some of these points
merit response31
26. A stock certificate is merely evidence of ownership of stock and
not the stock itself. Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 378 (1908);
BALLANTINu, CoRPORATIoNs 466 (1946). Hence, one can be a shareholder
without having a certificate.
27. Section 6.23(b).
28. S. C. CODE §62-165 (1962). See the Securities Commissioner's
Rules No. R-305(g)-1 and R-305 (g) -2 ,17 S. C. CODE p. 457 (1962).
29. Certainly, one would gladly have owned a fraction of a share of
Christiana Securities stock which, before the 100-1 split, traded from
$14,000 to $18,000 per share.
30. A corporation need not worry indefinitely with small fractional
interests since it may, under §5.11(c), issue scrip, having a limited life,
for fractional share interests.
31. As to the by-laws, Mr. Moore notes that while the Draft Version
of §6.1 permitted directors to change a shareholder-adopted by-law only
if specifically so authorized, the provision as enacted is the reverse, viz.,
474 [Vol. 15
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(A) Shareholder Meetings. Mr. Moore's chief objections
aim at (I) the statutory treatment of adjourned shareholder
meetings, and (II) voting by a corporate shareholder, al-
though additional comments are made on substitute annual
meetings32 and waiver of notice of a shareholder meeting by
attendance at the meeting.83
(I) Adjourned Meetings: Briefly the 1962 Act provides
that when a meeting is adjourned, fresh notice must be given
if the later meeting is more than 30 days after the earlier
meeting, but need not be given if less than 30 days; 4 the
same record date may be used for both the earlier and later
meetings; 35 and if a quorum is present at the earlier meeting,
the later meeting may proceed even if part of the original
quorum withdraws.3 6 It is suggested that an adjourned meet-
ing for which fresh notice is required (that is, a meeting
more than 30 days after the earlier meeting) may transact
business other than that which could have been transacted at
the earlier meeting thus "making the adjourned meeting a new
meeting" and negating the idea that an adjourned meeting
merely continues the earlier meeting. But since the purpose
the directors may change the by-law unless prohibited from doing so.
The objective is greater flexibility. Especially in a large corporation, it
may be inconvenient to summon the shareholders each time a by-law needs
to be changed. Clear from the section, however, is a prohibition on the
directors' amending the by-laws in certain ways prejudicial to shareholder
interests, 'viz., increasing the quorum or vote requirement for shareholders
to act on a by-law (§6.1(c)) or, "deny[ing], limit[ing], or impair[ing]"
the shareholders' by-law power (§6.1(d)).
. 32. Apparently accepting the principle of a substitute annual meeting
on call of anyone entitled to call a special meeting, Mr. Moore fears multi-
pie meetings summoned by different persons, and urges "clarifying this
point" but without specifying how. The chance of litigation, Mr. Moore
admits, is remote. Normally, the need for such a meeting will arise when
the directors, either through oversight or negligence, postpone the meeting.
If it arises in the context of an intra-corporate struggle for control, it is
likely that the issue must be resolved by the courts in any event, as such
struggles normally produce litigation. Apart from the unlikelihood of
multiple meetings and litigation on that point, the complexities of drafting
a statutory provision would seem real. Even so seemingly simple a rule
as preferring the first meeting called has its problems. For suppose in-
adequate notice is given by those who first call the meeting. Should a
later meeting then be "the" meeting, or should a court intervene to cure
the defects of notice in the first meeting? It seems wiser to declare a
general rule, and let the courts work out problems if some oddball situa-
tion should arise.
33. The §6.5(b) phrase which would permit a shareholder to wait until
the end of the meeting to object to defective notice is deleted by TEcH.
AMEND. BiL §55. Mr. Freeman's objection to the same provision in
§8.9(c) (directors' meetings) is similarly met by TECI. AMEND. BI.L §69
which amends out the phrase.
34. Section 6.4(c).
35. Section 6.6 (e).
36. Section 6.8 (c).
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and business of an annual meeting need not be stated in the
notice, anyway, it would seem that any business proper at
such a meeting would be equally proper at an adjournment.
In contrast, since a special meeting requires notice of its pur-
pose, it would follow that an adjournment could only take up
the business specified in the notice convening the special
meeting. And in all events, if adjourned more than thirty
days, the corporation must give the usual statutory notice,37
which would mean notice of the purpose of the adjourned
special meeting.
Section 6.6(e) permits, but does not require, fixing a new
record date for an adjournment of a meeting. It is suggested
that the directors could alter the character and results of a
meeting by setting a new record date and thus bring in new
shareholders whose shares have been transferred of record
between the old and the new record date. But this is precisely
what is intended: if there are new shareholders of record,
they, and not their predecessors who are no longer share-
holders, should be able to vote. In all events, it would seem
that equity would compel the predecessor shareholders of
record (as of the old record date) to give a proxy to the new
shareholders.38 Of course, this procedure might be manipu-
lated by insiders to further their personal advantage, but if
so there is a breach of fiduciary duty.39
(II) Voting by Corporate Shareholders: In the best of
all possible worlds, which ours pace Leibniz is not, Corpora-
tion A,40 when voting shares it owns in Corporation B,41
would designate the person or proxy to vote its shares, either
in its by-laws or a board resolution. In default of such perfec-
tion, section 6.12 (b) allows Corporation B to presume certain
37. Section 6.4(c).
38. Indeed, the pertinent question is whether to amend §6.6(e) to re-
quire a new record date when any meetings are adjourned so that old
shareholders (that is, shareholders as of an earlier record date) may not
vote at all.
39. A similar observation would apply to any efforts by insiders to
turn to their personal use and benefit the rule of §6.8(c) (which Mr.
Moore observes is the "modern and better view") that a quorum once
established continues although broken by withdrawal of shareholders or
despite adjournment. Its purpose is, of course, to prevent an obstructive
minority from withdrawing and breaking quorum at the prospect of action
distasteful to them: for if they could do so, they would have an effective
veto over action desired by a large number of shareholders.
40. Corporation A, the shareholder-corporation, may be a foreign or
domestic concern.
41. Corporation B is, of course, a domestic corporation, and our law
may constitutionally (and properly) declare what it may presume.
[Vol. 15
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authority, so that it may get on with its shareholders' meet-
ing. In effect, the presumption becomes conclusive after the
vote is taken, since the presumed authority must be denied
prior to taking the vote. This is the latest moment for au-
thorized corporate personnel to present credentials. Hence,
there is no uncertainty as to the result once the vote is taken.
True, an imposter might claim authority to vote the corpora-
tion's shares, or someone in Corporation A might fail or re-
fuse to get the meeting notice to the proper persons. But then
a proxy might be unauthorized or forged. These risks seem
outweighed by allowing Corporation B to rely, to the extent
permitted by section 6.12 (b), on appearances. 42 In all events,
disenfranchising Corporation A seems an unnecessarily harsh
sanction for not presenting evidence of authority in proper
form. 4
(B) Shareholder Control Devices: Mr. Moore doubts
whether section 6.15, achieves its purpose of broadly author-
izing voting agreements among shareholders which were left
in doubt by intimations in Johnson v. Spartanburg County
Fire Ass'n,4 4 that such agreements might violate public pol-
icy45 Specifically, since section 6.15 endorses only those pool-
ing agreements, which are "otherwise valid," a court might
conclude that such agreements were not "otherwise valid"
because of Johnson. Although it seems unlikely that courts
would strain to reach so curious a result in light of the patent
legislative intent to authorize pooling agreements, doubt
should be removed by amending out this phrase.46
42. Cf. §6.14(b): "a telegram or cablegram appearing to have been
transmitted by a shareholder" constitutes a valid proxy.
43. In the case of conflicting representation of Corporation A. voting
inspectors would, of course, perform a useful role in determining who is
entitled to vote, and in, perhaps, certifying what the vote would be count-
ing each faction's vote. This would pave the way for any necessary
judicial review. See §6.17 of the act. In this connection, Mr. Moore be-
lieves that voting inspectors should be required by statute to preserve the
evidence (including proxies) on which they base their certificate. We can
assume, however, that inspectors will take their duties seriously, realizing
the fiduciary nature of their post (see the last sentence of §6.17(a)), and
would preserve evidence, especially when there is a contest in which event
the inspectors may well operate under court orders. Undoubtedly, they
would be liable in damages for destruction or concealment of evidence if
this were shown to be wilful or fraudulent or otherwise improper.
44. 210 S. C. 56, 41 S. E. 2d 599 (1947).
45. Johnson suggested that mutual promises are insufficient consid-
eration, 210 S. C. 56, 72-73. One wonders what other consideration would
be thought proper, since §6.14(a) specifically provides that "[a] share-
holder shall not sell his vote to any person."
46. TECH. AMEND. BiLL §57.
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(C) Judicial Review of Director Elections: Under section
6.19, a shareholder or a director may secure judicial review
of a contested election of directors. However, a defeated can-
didate (who is obviously not a "director" within the section's
meaning) has no standing as such, and it seems proper to
deny him standing, since this would only encourage litigation
by defeated candidates. However, in practice, a defeated can-
didate who feels strongly enough about the matter to seek
judicial review can probably get it, either in his likely capac-
ity of a shareholder, or through suit by a friendly sharehold-
er (if the candidate himself has no shares). The inconven-
ience of permitting every person seeking a post as a corporate
,officer to contest his failure to get it would seem evident.
(D) Pre-Emptive Rights: Section 6.21 (b) requires a non-
,liscriminatory price to all shareholders when shares are of-
:fered them in satisfaction of their pre-emptive right. Mr.
Woore urges a like parity of price as between shareholders
.and any other purchaser to whom the shares are offered-
-typically, "outsiders" or the investing public after expiration
,of the pre-emptive right period. Clearly, the later price may
be higher than that to the shareholders, as is often true when
a corporation makes a new issue available first to existing
shareholders, even when they have no pre-emptive rights.
The fear is that the price to shareholders having pre-emptive
rights may exceed that to others. But if the lower (and later)
offering price to the public flows from a market price drop
between the two offering dates, there is no wrong to share-
holders. If the price disparity is a device to defeat sharehold-
er pre-emptive rights, there ip a violation of fiduciary duties
for which the courts may give adequate redress. Hence, any
amendment on this point seems unnecessary.
In discussing stock options, Mr. Nexsen correctly suggests
that pre-emptive rights should not attach to shares issued by
the corporation to cover stock options given to directors and
officers, as well as to employees (as presently limited) ; an
amendment before the General Assembly will correct this
omission.47
47. TECH. AmEND. BIL §64. Other clarifying changes in §6.21 of the
1962 act appear as TECH. AmEND. BILL §§59-63. Neither the Reporter
nor the Joint Committee share the view expressed by Mr. Nexsen that
§6,21 should be deleted in favor of MODEL ACT §24's blanket permission
to abolish pre-emptive rights. The justification for §6.21, even if "long,
cumbersome and complicated," as Mr. Nexsen describes it, is to declare a
[Vol. 15
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5. Directors and Officers: A variety of points under this
topic call for brief discussion, including several important
issues raised by Mr. Freeman's article.
(A) Duties of Directors and Officers: Section 8.15 de-
clares a standard of duty of directors and officers, but as
presently worded makes that duty run only to the corpora-
tion. There may be a negative inference that directors owe no
duties to shareholders as such. But this is contrary to estab-
lished law on the fiduciary duties of directors. For example,
it is clear that directors may not take advantage of their in-
side knowledge to exact a price favorable to themselves in
purchasing shares owned by a shareholder of their corpora-
tion. Even assuming that the courts of this State would not
infer any purpose to reduce the customary scope of director
duties, it would be necessary to examine the case law to find
the principle established. The object of section 8.15 is to
codify director duties so that one knows of their existence
from the face of the statute. Accordingly, to clarify and re-
lieve uncertainty in an important area, the Technical Amend-
ments Bill proposes that director duties extend to "the cor-
poration" and to "the shareholders."
48
(B) Transactions Between a Corporation and Its Direc-
tors and Officers: Section 8.16 of the 1962 Act sets forth
standards validating transactions between directors and offi-
cers and their corporation since, especially in a close corpora-
tion, these may be indispensable to the enterprise--indeed a
chief source of its assets and funds. This section, of course,
both codifies and modifies Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary.40
Several amendments improve this section. First, the three
alternative tests for the validity of interested director trans-
actions have been clarified by adding certain words.50 Sec-
rule of law applicable to the varied situations in which pre-emptive rights
may arise, subject to variation in the articles of incorporation. New York's
recent corporation law takes precisely the same approach as does South
Carolina. N. Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §622 (1961).
48. TEcH. AMEND BILL §73.
49. 219 S. C. 174, 64 S. E. 2d 524 (1951).
50. Section 8.16(a), italicizing the language of TECH. AiMiEND. BmL
§74 reads as follows:
"(a) No transaction in which a director or officer has a personal or
adverse interest, as defined in subsection (b), shall be void or voidable
solely for this reason or solely because he is present at or participates in
the meeting or his vote is counted, if
(1) The material facts as to his interest and as to the transaction are
disclosed or are known to the board of directors or committee and are
noted in the minutes, and the board or committee authorizes, approves or
13
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ondly, Mr. Freeman criticizes a clause in the definition in
section 8.16 (b) of "transaction in which a director or officer
has a personal or adverse interest." As presently worded,
this definition includes transactions "between a corporation
and any of its parent, subsidiary, or affiliated corporations."
Mr. Freeman's article sets forth concisely the problems which
this presents. This has been corrected by deleting this provi-
sion from the definition and implementing the statutory ob-
jectives by dealing with inter-corporate transactions in a
special provision which prescribes a more liberal rule,51 re-
flecting the case law.
52
Thirdly, Mr. Freeman criticizes extending section 8.16 (b)'s
definition of "adverse interest" to include "a contract or any
other transaction betveen a corporation and any corporation
. .. in which one or more of its directors or officers... have
a financial interest, direct or indirect," 58 fearing its invalida-
tion of contracts between a corporation and, say, General
Motors in which a director may own shares. In such cases,
typically the vote of the director who happens to have a stock-
holder's investment in such a company will not be decisive,
(complying with the first test,54) and even if it were, fairness
could probably be proved easily by showing that the contract
was negotiated at arm's length with the other corporation
(thus meeting the third test55). In all events, however, cor-
ratifies the transaction by a vote sufficient for such purpose without
counting the vote of the interested director or directors; or if
(2) Although the vote of the interested director or directors is de-
cisive of approval or disapproval of the transaction, the material facts as
to his interest and as to the transaction are disclosed or known to the
shareholders, and the transaction is specifically approved by vote of the
shareholders without counting the votes of the shares owned or controlled
by the interested director or directors; or if
(3) Notwithstanding the limitations contained in subparagraphs (1)
and (2) of this subsection, the transaction is fair and equitable as to the
corporation at the time it is authorized or approved, and the party assert-
ing the fairness of the transaction establishes fairness."
51. TECH. AMEND. BIL §76 would add the following provision to
§8.16: "(c) No contract or other transaction by a corporation with (1)
any of its subsidiary, parent, or affiliated corporations, or (2) with
another corporation in which there is a common director, shall be void
or voidable solely for this reason, if the contract or other transaction is
fair and equitable as of the date it is authorized, approved, or ratified.
The party asserting the unfairness of any such contract or transaction
shall establish unfairness."
52. Everett v. Phillips. 288 N. Y. 227, 43 N. E. 2d 18 (1942); Chelrob
v. Barrett, 293 N. Y. 442. 57 N. E. 2d 825 (1944).
53. Section 8.16(b) (3). This provision will appear as §8.16(b) (2)
if TECHr. AmEND. BILL §75 is enacted.
F4. Section 8.16(a) (1).
55. Section 8.16(a) (3).
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porate lawyers are today deeply concerned with the ethical
questions raised by contracts between Corporation A and
Corporation B in which Corporation A directors own stock.50
Disclosure by Corporation A directors of their interest in
Corporation B seems appropriate and simple, and would
doubtlessly be done by the director sensitive to something
above the standards of the market place.57 No corporation
statute need apologize for imposing high standards of ethical
conduct, and especially disclosure, upon those holding posi-
tions of trust.
(C) Director Liabilities for Improper Dividends: Mr.
Freeman poses a "provoking problem" whether, under the
new act, a shareholder who has received an unlawful divi-
dend may sue derivatively to compel the directors to restore
the dividend to the corporation thereby benefiting the
suing shareholder. If the shareholder knowingly received the
unlawful dividend, he would himself be liable to restore the
amount he received. 58 If the shareholder did not receive the
dividend under circumstances implying his knowedge of the
impropriety, there seems no reason why he should not enforce
the corporate cause of action by suing derivatively. In all
events, since derivative actions are equitable in nature, a
shareholder with hands dirtied by knowing receipt of an im-
proper dividend would likely have no standing to press the
action. And finally, equity courts can and do determine the
recipients of funds restored in a derivative action so as not to
work a windfall to a wrongdoer.5 9 Similarly, court control of"a derivative suit would probably preclude a shareholder suing
derivatively to compel directors to restore a dividend, techni-
cally unlawful, if approved by a creditor, provided that no
injury from the unlawful dividend resulted to other creditors
or to preferred shareholders.
56. It has been suggested that a useful test is whether Corporation
A's director would care to see fully stated in the Wall Street Journal his
stock interest in Corporation B with which Corporation A has contractpd.
See Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules. 50 CALIF. L. REV. 4(18,
418 (1962). The president of Chrysler Corporation resigned upon public
disclosure of his stock interest in a Chrysler supplier. Similarly in issue
is the propriety of contracts between Hughes Tool Co. and Trans World
Airlines in which Hughes Tool (and ultimately Howard Hughes) held a
large stock interest, now sterilized through a voting trust. But cf. Findley
v. Garrett Corp., 109 Cal. App. 2d, 240 P. 2d 421 (1952).
57. Cardozo, J., in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E.
545,546 (1928).
58. Section 6.24.
59. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann. 219 F. 2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), and
Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A. 2d 904 (s. Ct. 1938).
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Finally, no director will find himself liable for an unlaw-
ful dividend of which he had no knowledge. Thus section
8.19 (e) states a rule of liability for the director who is pres-
ent at the meeting. Section 8.12(b) applies to the absent
director who is presumed to ratify action, such as an unlaw-
ful dividend, unless "after learning of the action taken" he
objects in proper form. Clearly, the absent director who
never knew of the improper action is not liable, since (1) at
common law there is no ratification unless there is knowl-
edge of the material facts, and (2) section 8.12(b) in terms
requires knowledge by using the phrase "after learning of the
action taken." 60
(D) Cumulative Voting and Election of Directors: Both
Mr. Freeman, Mr. Nexsen and Mr. Moore rightly stress
doubts engendered by the mandatory cumulative voting pro-
vision of the South Carolina constitution, recognizing that it
shadows many important sections of the new statute. True,
cumulative voting is required in the 1962 Act, although the
Draft Version had recommended that it be permissive, viz.,
subject to abolition if so provided in the articles of incorpora-
tion. Attorneys fear that the broad language of the constitu-
tional provision might have two adverse effects. (1) It may
render suspect any procedure, however reasonable, for regu-
lating the exercise of the mandatory cumulative voting right,
such as the requirement that one who proposes to cumulate
his votes give notice of his intention either before the share-
holders' meeting or at the meeting before voting begins.6 '
(2) Some think it renders suspect, in varying degrees, any
provision which arguably cuts down the cumulative voting
right. Thus, a few question, as does Mr. Freeman's article,
whether the limited permission to classify directors unconsti-
60. In several particulars, not pertinent to the point discussed in the
text, §8.12 has been reworded to clarify its validation of director action
without a meeting. The very nature of the conditions for validating in-
formal director action will normally confine its application to close
corporations.
61. Section 6.20(b). Mr. Moore's article observes that the wording
of this subsection may imply that unless each shareholder individually
and separately gives notice, before or at the meeting, of his intention to
vote cumulatively his shares, he may not cumulate his votes. The inten-
tion of §6.20(b) is to give advance warning so that one faction will not
spring cumulative voting on an unwary group of shareholders who may
have customarily voted straight (since cumulative voting is a right, not a
compulsion). TECH. AMEND. BILL 4§59-60 proposes a rewording which
will make the meaning unmistakably clear on the face of the provision.
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tutionally impairs the right.62 A more general concern is
that it may be constitutionally impermissible ever tW deprive
any shares, including preferred shares, of the right to vote
for directors-a doubt which would cast a shadow over pro-
visions of the old law, and the almost universal practice of
making preferred stock non-voting, not to mention the possi-
bility of issuing non-voting common stock. Other attorneys,
including the Reporter, take the view that the courts of this
State would be reluctant to strain the language of the ancient
constitutional provision to negate an established practice with
regard to the issue of stock. But the significant point is not
who is the better prophet of the probable outcome of litiga-
tion. Rather it is the fact of any uncertainty making respon-
sible attorneys unwilling to give a firm opinion that a normal
type of security issued by innumerable corporations in nearly
every state of the union is also constitutional in this State.
One objective of the 1962 Act was to eliminate the uncertain-
ties inherent in the old law. Emerging now is the even more
important objective of eliminating a damaging uncertainly in
the constitution itself. There is apparently no dissent to the
proposition that corporations should be able, as the new law
permits, to issue non-voting shares of preferred or special
classes. There seems to be wide agreement that the constitu-
tional provison ought either to be repealed outright (thus
making cumulative voting a statutory right only,63 or, at the
least, reworded so that it does not prevent issuing the types
of non-voting stock ordinarily marketed in this country. 4
62. Mr. Freeman fears that director classification may be unconstitu-
tional. Of course, no one can project the outcome of a court decision
when and if the question is presented, if only because of the unpredictable
factual context in which the issue appears. It would seem surprising if
the courts were to strike down a well established business practice both
in South Carolina and elsewhere, since most, but not all, courts in other
jurisdictions have sustained director classification even when cumulative
voting is a constitutional right. See the cases cited in Reporter's Note,
p. 146, DRAFT VEnsioN, S. C. Bus. CoRP. ACT OF 1962.
63. The Reporter's personal view is that, at the least, the constitutional
provision should be repealed entirely, and that the General Assembly alone
should determine by statute (as it has in the new Corporation law)
whether cumulative voting should be mandatory. Thus, even if S. C.
Const. art. IX, §11 were repealed, cumulative voting would remain man-
datory in this State since §6.20 of the 1962 act so requires.
64. The Reporter has proposed the following language to reword S. C.
CONST., art. IX, §11. Because of the extreme importance of the wording
of any constitutional provision closest scrutiny and criticism of this pro-
posal is urged:
'Each holder of shares entitled to vote at an election of directors of
a corporation organized under the laws of this State shall have the right,
whether voting his shares in person or by proxy, to cast as many votes
as shall equal the number of shares which he owns multiplied by the
17
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Stated otherwise, at a minimum, the constitutional provision
should be confined to its proper sphere of operation: to guar-
antee cumulative voting rights to the holders of all shares
which, by the articles of incorporation, are entitled to vote
for directors, which, in practice, means the holders of com-
mon stock.
6. Mergers and Asset Sales: The discussion by Mr. John-
stone and Miss Galloway on mergers, assets sales, and ap-
praisal rights raises two points of great importance. First,
they suggest that the comprehensive provisions of section
6.27 dealing with appraisal rights should include, as did the
Draft Version, the Model Act provision permitting a share-
holder to vote some of his shares for, the other shares against,
corporate action, and not forfeit appraisal rights as to shares
voted against the proposal because some are voted for it. At
first blush, this appears to be a device for shareholders to
hedge by voting some but not all shares for mergers, consoli-
dations, and asset sales. The dominant purpose of the provi-
sion is, however, to aid the broker who has registered in his
"street name" the shares of many different customers some
of whom may wish to vote for, others against, corporate ac-
tion. In order to perform his duties to a customer, the broker
must be able to vote the shares as the client directs. Absent
statutory sanction for a registered shareholder to split his
vote, the broker must have transferred on the corporate books
the shares of the dissenting customers so that they may vote
against the proposed corporate action and claim dissenter's
appraisal rights. This may prove an unwieldy and incon-
venient procedure. Recently, both the New Jersey65 and Dela-
ware66 courts have affirmed, on slightly different grounds,
that the registered shareholder (in each case, a broker carry-
ing shares in a street name) may split the vote and seek ap-
praisal rights as to shares voted negatively. In order to ef-
number of directors for whose election he is entitled to vote. Any such
shareholder may cast the votes so cumulated for any one candidate, or
distribute the votes so cumulated- among any number of candidates, for
whose election as director he is entitled to vote. The foregoing provisions
shall not be interpreted to preclude any corporation from issuing shares
of any preferred or special classes having voting rights only to the extent
provided by the articles of incorporation or any amendment thereto or
otherwise as required or permitted by statute."
65. Bache & Co. v. General Instrument Co., 74 N. J. Super. 92, 180
A. 2d 535, certification denied, 38 N. J. 181. 183 A. 2d 87 (1962); see
the comment in this issue on the Bache case, infra at 579.
66. Colonial Realty Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 185 A. 2d 754 (Del
Ch. 1962).
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feet this obviously desirable procedure, an amendment to the
1962 Act has been proposed, 67 adopting the language of the
Draft Version,68 which in turn derives from Model Act sec-
tion 73.69
Secondly, a provision of the 1962 Act,70 introduced from
the floor of the House of Representatives, and unique in
American corporation statutes, keeps alive certain derivative
actions by a shareholder despite his dissenting to proposed
,corporate action. This provision does not interfere with the
customary dismissal of derivative actions upon settlement of
.a case. Rather it keeps alive only those actions which have
been instituted on or before a merger, consolidation or asset
sale, and provides only that the act of dissenting does not
interfere with the pendency of the action. Generally, on dis-
senting, the shareholder loses all rights "of a shareholder"
including the right to vote.71 This provision is not inconsist-
ent, since it keeps alive a cause of action on behalf of the
-corporation, viz., an action where the shareholder is a sort of
.guardian ad litem for the corporate interests. It apparently
overrules Johnson v. Baldwin.7 2
67. Tca. AmEND. BiLL §67.
68. The Johnston-Galloway article suggests that the permission for
!split voting by registered shareholders might be limited to fiduciaries, in
'order to exclude the shareholder who is obviously only hedging. Apart
from whether such hedges are inherently undesirable (except as it may
increase the number of dissenting shares and hence the probable cash out-
lay) and the infrequency of individual shareholder hedging, it is difficult
to find language suitably confining the provision to its purpose, the ac-
commodation of brokers. To confine it to fiduciaries generally is not
helpful since some fiduciaries, viz., trustees, ought not to hedge any more
than individuals. It might be feasible to limit it to any broker or dealer
in whose name are registered securities for more than one customer, al-
though no State seems s6 far to have adopted this form of limitation.
However, this formula would not be broad enough to accommodate a
voting trustee who, under §6.16(g) of the new act, must permit certificate]holders the right to seek appraisal rights.
69. In connection with the preceding footnote, it is to be observed
that Mr. Moore's article criticises §6.16(g) which preserves appraisal
Tights to voting trust certificate holders, unless the voting trust otherwise
provides. This provision cannot prejudice the corporation. It need only
give notice to the voting trustees as registered shareholders. The voting
-trustee should, as in the case of a broker holding shares for many clients
in his name, determine whether any certificate holders wish to demand
appraisal rights, and take the necessary steps. His failure to do so would
-not prejudice the validity of the corporate action, but presumably he
'would be liable in damages for breach of the fiduciary duty which he
,owes to certificate holders. Brown v. McLanahan, 148 F. 2d 703 (4th
'Cir. 1945).
70. Section 6.27(k).
71. Section 6.27(d).
72. 221 S. C. 160, 69 S. E. 2d 594 (1952).
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Mr. Johnston and Miss Galloway raise the question wheth-
er the appraisal procedure excludes the jurisdiction of courts
to enjoin a fraudulent or bad faith merger. Clearly, under
well established cases, at least in other states, the residual
equity jurisdiction continues in force. The Delaware courts,
however, have narrowed the scope of equity powers so that it
is extremely difficult, perhaps practically impossible, to infer
fraud from the valuation of interests by directors in a merger
or consolidation. 73 Thus, if the shareholder thinks that his
interest has not been fairly valued in a transaction to which
he may dissent, his remedy is to get out by demanding the
fair value (ultimately for court determination, if contested,)
of his shares. The approach of the Delaware courts is thus
to require a showing of fraud in some area other than valua-
tion of share interests, at least in the absence of some fla-
grant or obviously bad-faith under-valuation of shareholder
interests amounting to fraud or breach of duty. Thus, equi-
table relief would seem proper if the directors of a corporation
effected a sale of corporate assets (an event giving rise in
South Carolina to appraisal rights) to a corporation con-
trolled by the directors at a valuation which enhanced their
position but compromised that of the other shareholders. In
all events, it seems unnecessary specifically to reserve equi-
table jurisdiction in this area since the courts would not infer
its exclusion merely by the presence of appraisal rights
which, after all, is just a device to modify the effect of the
old common law rule requiring unanimous shareholder con-
sent to major corporate changes.
Finally, the South Carolina statute, by providing appraisal
rights both on mergers and consolidations and on asset sales,
sidesteps the de facto merger problems, common to jurisdic-
tions awarding such rights only on mergers but not on asset
sales. Hence, the incentive in such states is to contort a
transaction into the form of an asset sale. Although some
courts have held that such transactions are de facto mergers
and give rise to appraisal rights, Delaware which gave its
78. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 178 A. 2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1962),
holding that as to the short-form merger, at least, appraisal remedies are
the exclusive remedy even if the "outsiders"' shares in the merged sub-
sidiary are allegedly grossly undervalued. For "it was obviously the in-
tention of the Legislature that disputes as to the value of minority stock-
holders should be settled by an appraisal proceeding." 178 A. 2d at 314.
This reasoning would apply beyond the specific context of a short form
merger. Stauffer was foreshadowed by Bruce v. E. L. Bruce Co., 174 A.
2d 29 (Del. Ch. 1961).
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nihil obstat to evading appraisal rights in the Heilbrunn case74
formally placed its imprimatur on the practice in Hariton V.
Arco Electronics, Inc.,75 thereby, for all practical purposes,
abolishing appraisal rights altogether. In South Carolina,
the possibilities are limited. The only area for maneuvering
shareholders out of appraisal rights results from the fact
that appraisal rights on asset sales apply only to the share-
holders of the selling, but not of the purchasing, corpora-
tion.76 Hence, appraisal rights might be avoided if the larger
of the two corporations, or more exactly the corporation hav-
ing the larger number of shareholders likely to dissent, as-
sumes the posture of purchaser rather than seller of assets.
But even so, an obvious upside-down sale-purchase transac-
tion may be treated as evasive of shareholder rights, and the
court might either (1) define the purchaser and seller as they
really are, and award appraisal rights to the true seller,77 or
perhaps go so far as (2) declare the entire transaction to be
a de facto merger, and give appraisal rights to all parties.78
A similar result may occur in the case of a stock acquisition
-what the English term a "takeover bid." 
9
In conclusion, it is essential to recall that the South Caro-
lina court has observed that a sale of assets may constitute a
"merger in fact" even though the corporate entity of the sell-
ing corporation remains intact, i.e., the selling corporation is
not dissolved.80
7. Dissolution of Corporations: A significant amendment
to section 12.15 (a), which specifies the grounds on which a
shareholder may invoke equity jurisdiction to dissolve a cor-
poration, makes this relief available when the acts of those
in control are "illegal or fraudulent or dishonest," or when
these acts are "oppressive or unfairly prejudicial" to the cor-
poration or to a shareholder whether in his capacity as a
74. Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 150 A. 2d 755 (Del. S. Ct. 1959).
75. 31 U. S. L. WEEK 2362 (Del. S. Ct. 1 24-1963). Finch v. Warrior
Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, 141 AtI. 54 (1928) and Argenbright v.
Phoenix Fin. Co., 21 Del. Ch. 288, 187 Atl. 124 (1936) were said by the
court in Hariton to "assume [the] legality" of the practice of using asset
sales to "achieve the same result as a merger."
76. Section 11.5.
77. Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A. 2d 25 (1958)
(alternative holding).
78. Ibid.
79. Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 159 A. 2d 146 (N. J.
Super. 1960).
80. Beckroge v. South Carolina Power Co., 197 S. C. 184, 194-95, 15
S. E. 2d 124 (1941).
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shareholder, director or officer.8" This latter clause recog-
nizes that in close corporations a shareholder's position as, an
officer or director is often more significant than his share-
holder status, since most of his compensation may be received
as a salary (which the corporation may deduct for tax pur-
poses) rather than as dividends (which the corporation may
not deduct). Depriving the shareholder of his officer status,
and thus interfering with its prerequisites, may be the most
serious injury which can be done to him, and should give rise
to a right to seek relief. Besides the right to seek dissolution,
such a wrong would entitle a shareholder to seek the alterna-
tive relief afforded by section 12.23.82
In his article on dissolution of corporations, Mr. Smythe
expresses concern that section 12.12(b)'s provision that re-
instatement of a corporation whose charter has been forfeited
has "no effect upon any issue of personal liability" of direc-
tors during the interim between forfeiture and reinstate-
ment, may give an undeserved windfall to creditors who dealt
with corporate officers in good faith believing that enter-
prise had limited liability, and correspondingly impose an
unexpected liability on those officers. The intent of this sec-
tion is negative. Whether or not the directors and officers
of the dissolved corporation are personally liable is a matter
of common law; the statutory provision is merely a saving
clause which precludes restoration of corporate status from
destroying whatever common law liability arises from trans-
actions during the interim period. It is impossible to see how
any legitimate interests are improperly affected. Since dis-
solution does not occur until after notice of impending disso-
lution has been sent to the corporation by the Secretary of
State, the directors, in contracting with creditors, obviously
know what they are doing, and they are not acting for an
31. TECH. AMEND. BILL §89: "(4) The acts of the directors or those
in control of the corporation (A) are illegal or fraudulent or dishonest,
or (B) are oppressive or unfairly prejudicial either to the corporation or
to any shareholder whether in his capacity as a shareholder, director, or
officer of the corporation."
82. Section 12.23 is modeled upon §210 of the English Companits Act
of 1946, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 38. An important Scottish decision, Elder v.
Elder & Watson, [1952] Sess. Cas. 49, narrowly construed the English
provision as affording relief only if the shareholder showed some injury
to his status as a shareholder. In this case, since he had been seriously
damaged by being ousted from his position as an officer of the corpora-
tion, relief was denied. This technical reading has been roundly criticized,
and the Jenkins Committee, proposing revisions of the English Companies
Act, recommended rewording of §210 to assure equal protection to a
shareholder's interest as an officer or director.
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enterprise of limited liability. And although the creditor has
the advantage of personal liability, this liability results from
the fact that he extended credit to what is in effect a partner-
ship, although he did not know it at the time.
8. Foreign Corporations: As Mr. Evans notes, section
13.14(d), continuing the long-standing provision of section
10-424, permits extra-territorial personal service of process
on unauthorized foreign corporations. He suggests, however,
that this technique should be avoided as an "exclusive meth-
od" of process service, and viewed only as a "helpful supple-
mental procedure." There would seem to be no real doubts as
to the validity of South Carolina judicial action grounded
solely on extra-territorial service. Two problems must al-
ways be distinguished: (1) whether the local courts have
jurisdiction of the subject matter of some action against the
foreign corporation, and (2) whether the statutory method
of serving process is adequate. s3 The first depends upon the
constitutional sufficiency of local contacts with the out-of-
state corporation.84 As to the second, the Supreme Court of
the United States has said that the adequacy of service, "so
far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or
not the form of substituted service provided for such cases
and employed is reasonably calculated to give [defendant]
actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard."5' 5 Thus, in Millikin v. Meyer,86 domicile alone gave a
state jurisdiction over an individual domiciliary, and extra-
territorial process service sufficed to give the court jurisdic-
tion of the person. By analogy, if a foreign corporation's
local contacts are sufficient to ground the court's jurisdiction,
extra-territorial process service should be adequate for due
process purposes.8 7 Indeed, the Secretary of State constantly
effects extra-territorial service of process when he sends a
copy of process by registered mail to the foreign corporation.
83. See Springs Cotton Mills v. Machinecraft, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 372,
376 (W. D. S. C. 1957).
84. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 90 L. Ed. 95
(1945).
85. Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463, 85 L. Ed. 278, 283 (1940).
86. 311 U. S. 457. 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940).
87. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fiber Mills, 239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir.
1956) held that a single interstate shipment of goods from New York to
North Carolina under a contract made in New York was insufficient
under International Shoe's "minimum contacts" test to sustain the juris-
diction of North Carolina courts over the New York shipper. The adequacy
of process service was not in question, only "whether there is legal power
in the [North Carolina] courts over the [New York] corporation."
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In principle, so far as assuring notice is concerned, there is
no difference between this admittedly constitutional proce-
dure and notice delivered to any out-of-state corporation by
personal service.8 8 Although the Supreme Court of the United
States has yet to rule squarely on the adequacy of this proce-
dure, its decisions point to its validity, and state supreme
courts, taking the cue, have upheld extra-territorial process
service on a foreign corporation.
89
Mr. Evans' article observes that when foreign corporations
are sued locally, venue must be proper even though the court
has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person. As
he indicates, the general venue provisions of section 10-303
would normally govern. However, the Corporation Act, while
not specifying venue in actions by and against foreign cor-
porations,9 0 implies that for authorized foreign corporations
a proper, although probably not exclusive, venue would be the
county in which the corporation's registered office is located
(and its registered agent resides). And since under section
13.13 process is ordinarily served on the foreign corporation's
local registered office, probably venue will often be laid in
the same county. Otherwise, there seems no basis for dis-
turbing the generally applicable venue rules.
III.
The enactment of the Technical Amendments Bill will com-
plete the initial phase of work on the Corporation Law. We
say "initial phase," for no statute is complete which must
88. To make doubly sure that the foreign corporation receives actual
notice when extra-territorial service is made, the attorney should see to it
that service is made on a corporate officer or other person clearly appro-
priate for receiving service. Thus, one might serve process on any officer
or other person who is entitled to receive service under the statutes in
the corporation's home jurisdiction. See also the list of persons who may
receive service for a South Carolina corporation in S. C. CODE §10-421
(1962).
89. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432 176 N E. 2d 761 (1961). Cf., Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143
N. E. 2d 673 (1957). See also Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 306,
259 P. 2d 905 (1953). The general problem is discussed in Ehrenzweig &
Mills Personal Service Outside the State, 41 CALIF. L. Rav. 383 (1953),
and tcBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: -Actions Arising
Out of Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 CALIF. L. Rav. 331, 342-43 (1946).
90. As to domestic corporations, the act frequently specifies the venue
as the county in which the corporation's registered office is located. See,
e.g., §§6.26(d) (enforce inspection rights); 6.3(c) (2) (order shareholder
meetings); 6.19 (review of director elections); 6.27(i) (shareholder ap-
praisal rights); 8.7(d) (removal of directors); 12.15 (dissolution of corpora-
tion by court order); 12.23 (relief alternative to dissolution).
[Vol. 15
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deal with an ever-growing area of the law such as corpora-
tions. Of one thing we can be certain: problems unforeseen
by anyone will emerge, ambiguities will turn up in the most
flawlessly drafted act, new business techniques will appear,
and judicial decisions will occasionally distort the meaning
or pervert the intention of any statute. For these reasons,
no statute is finished.
The new South Carolina statute now places it in the fore-
front of states with modern, up-to-date corporate laws. To
retain that position, there must be a continuous monitoring
of the corporation laws of this state: to add new provisions,
make needed amendments, discourage unethical practices,
promote sound corporate operatioRs, and the like. This can
best be accomplished through a permanent committee, such
as the Joint Committee which secured enactment of the new
Securities and Corporations Acts. Such a committee can best
keep watch over the new statutes and keep them up with the
changing times. It is to be hoped that the Bar, which has
such a vital interest in these matters, will take the needed
steps to promote such a project.
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